Tradition and morality: The modernity in dispute

Abstract

It is my proposal for this paper the development of a critic evaluation of one of the thesis of Alasdair MacIntyre. According to this thesis the failure of the illustrated project for a foundation of morals is a consequence of the abandonment of the tradition of virtues. It is in my intentions for this paper to show that although such a failure is related with the moral disagreement –pretty characteristic of the present pluralist culture- is of no use to have recourse to a so called “unified tradition” of virtues in order to question the rationality of modern moral thought. This is no more than an inoperative philosophical strategy that does not allow responding to the insufficiencies of the illustrated project or improving its theoretical systems of justification. In first place I will expose why the concept of “tradition” used by MacIntyre is, in fact, a consequence of the illustration thought and not a negation of it. After that I will continue showing that the liberalism, being considered as a tradition as well, can not be evaluated or dispossessed of legitimacy by means of the tradition of virtues, as MacIntyre intends.